## Case

### Off

#### A. Our interpretation is that the affirmative should have to instrumentally defend the institutional implementation of a topical plan.

#### B. Violation – the aff doesn’t defend a plan.

#### C. Best for fairness.

#### 1. Plan focus is the only predictable way of affirming the resolution. Philosophical and theoretical concerns certainly play into the ways that policies are made, but the resolution only calls for us to defend and/or question political-institutional implementations of these kinds of concerns.

#### 2. Plan focus is the only way to ensure a fair division of ground. The affirmative has the advantage of trying to solve the most heinous problems of the status quo—without plan focus, debates devolve into whether or not things like racism, sexism, classism, or homophobia are good or bad. While problems are often less contestable, solutions to these problems are—we can debate about whether or not a particular proposal will fix or worsen these problems and proffer our own solutions.

#### D. Best for education:

#### No solvency for their critique without institutional focus. We must try to change policy in order to change the world—the concentration of power in the hands of political elites is inevitable, so we must work within that system to check oppression and violence.

Themba-Nixon 2k [Makani, Executive Director of the Praxis Project, *Colorlines* 3.2, pg. 12]

The flourish and passion with which she made the distinction said everything. Policy is for wonks, sell-out politicians, and ivory-tower eggheads. Organizing is what real, grassroots people do. Common as it may be, this distinction doesn't bear out in the real world. Policy is more than law. It is any written agreement (formal or informal) that specifies how an institution, governing body, or community will address shared problems or attain shared goals. It spells out the terms and the consequences of these agreements and is the codification of the body's values-as represented by those present in the policymaking process. Given who's usually present, most policies reflect the political agenda of powerful elites. Yet, policy can be a force for change-especially when we bring our base and community organizing into the process. In essence, policies are the codification of power relationships and resource allocation. Policies are the rules of the world we live in. Changing the world means changing the rules. So, if organizing is about changing the rules and building power, how can organizing be separated from policies? Can we really speak truth to power, fight the right, stop corporate abuses, or win racial justice without contesting the rules and the rulers, the policies and the policymakers? The answer is no-and double no for people of color. Today, racism subtly dominates nearly every aspect of policymaking. From ballot propositions to city funding priorities, policy is increasingly about the control, de-funding, and disfranchisement of communities of color. What Do We Stand For? Take the public conversation about welfare reform, for example. Most of us know it isn't really about putting people to work. The right's message was framed around racial stereotypes of lazy, cheating "welfare queens" whose poverty was "cultural." But the new welfare policy was about moving billions of dollars in individual cash payments and direct services from welfare recipients to other, more powerful, social actors. Many of us were too busy to tune into the welfare policy drama in Washington, only to find it washed up right on our doorsteps. Our members are suffering from workfare policies, new regulations, and cutoffs. Families who were barely getting by under the old rules are being pushed over the edge by the new policies. Policy doesn't get more relevant than this. And so we got involved in policy-as defense. Yet we have to do more than block their punches. We have to start the fight with initiatives of our own. Those who do are finding offense a bit more fun than defense alone. Living wage ordinances, youth development initiatives, even gun control and alcohol and tobacco policies are finding their way onto the public agenda, thanks to focused community organizing that leverages power for community-driven initiatives. - Over 600 local policies have been passed to regulate the tobacco industry. Local coalitions have taken the lead by writing ordinances that address local problems and organizing broad support for them. - Nearly 100 gun control and violence prevention policies have been enacted since 1991. - Milwaukee, Boston, and Oakland are among the cities that have passed living wage ordinances: local laws that guarantee higher than minimum wages for workers, usually set as the minimum needed to keep a family of four above poverty. These are just a few of the examples that demonstrate how organizing for local policy advocacy has made inroads in areas where positive national policy had been stalled by conservatives. Increasingly, the local policy arena is where the action is and where activists are finding success. Of course, corporate interests-which are usually the target of these policies-are gearing up in defense. Tactics include front groups, economic pressure, stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. By getting into the policy arena in a proactive manner, we can take our demands to the next level. Our demands can become law, with real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a decisionmaker with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, this work requires a certain amount of interaction with "the suits," as well as struggles with the bureaucracy, the technical language, and the all-too-common resistance by decisionmakers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real difference in their communities. Of course, policy work is just one tool in our organizing arsenal, but it is a tool we simply can't afford to ignore. Making policy work an integral part of organizing will require a certain amount of retrofitting. We will need to develop the capacity to translate our information, data, and experience into stories that are designed to affect the public conversation. Perhaps most important, we will need to move beyond fighting problems and on to framing solutions that bring us closer to our vision of how things should be. And then we must be committed to making it so.

### Off

#### a) A politics of lines of flight inevitably restratifies and turns into what it opposes – their transcendence of boundaries can’t happen without tons of violence. They start out as Fight Club but turn into Project Mayhem.

Bülent Diken, lecturer in Sociology at Lancaster University, and Carsten Bagge Laustsen, Ph.D. student at the University of Copenhagen, Department of Political Sciences, September 2001, online: http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/papers/Diken-Laustsen-Enjoy-Your-Fight.pdf, accessed August 24, 2004

Fight Club is constructed along a line of flight in the Deleuzian sense. Its lines of flight are attempts to escape segmentarity, be it molar or molecular, to disorganize the social bond. It is “only after you lose everything … that you’re free to do anything.... We have to break everything to make something better out of ourselves” (Palahniuk 1997: 70, 52). Fight Club seeks to attain a Body without Organs, the zero-degree of symbolic difference, an undifferentiated body with no face, no privileged zones and forms: “a chaos so perfect, so pure, so complete that in it all differences, all articulations are effaced. Pure chaos, the undifferentiated reality” (Callinicos 1982: 95). Complete destratification. With Bataille its principle is “expenditure”, with Deleuze and Guattari “antiproduction”, a universal tendency co-existing with exchange and production. Fight Club wants to “go back to zero”. “The answer is not improvement but destruction, including self-destruction” (Palahniuk 1997: 49). In his Programme from 1936 and his analysis of fascism, Bataille concludes that there is much the Left can learn from the organizational forms of fascism (Bataille 1997, 1997b; Sørensen 2001). “Assume the function of destruction and decomposition…. Take part in the destruction of the existing world… Fight for the decomposition … of all communities…” (Bataille 1997: 121). Fight Club, too, seeks “a prematurely induced dark age¼. The complete and right-away destruction of civilization.” (Palahniuk 1997: 125). Bataille had argued that it is necessary to affirm the “value of violence” and “to take upon oneself perversion and crime” (1997: 121); and Fight Club, again, violently lifts the curse: “yes, you’re going to have to kill someone¼. No excuses and no lies¼. You are the same decaying organic matter as everyone else” (Palahniuk 1997: 125, 134). Fight Club wants the whole world to “hit the bottom” (Ibid. 123). Echoing the French nouveaux philosophes, especially the Situationist manifesto, it especially attacks the society of spectacle. “Fight club isn’t about words … Fight club is not football on television. You aren’t watching a bunch of men you don’t know halfway around the world beating on each other live by satellite with a two-minute delay” (Ibid. 50, 51). Fight Club is about street fights, urban anarchism, and strategies of subversion. “Realize … the irony of the animal world”, continues Bataille’s Programme (1997: 121). In his imagination, Jack walks up the entrance of a cave and out comes a penguin. “Slide”, it says, smiling. “Without any effort, we slid through tunnels and galleries” (Palahniuk 1997: 20). It is no coincidence that the social space, in which Jack/penguin “slides”, is a smooth social space. Losing the social bond is freedom, and in this sense Fight Club is a Deleuzian “war machine”, a free assemblage oriented along a line of flight out of the repressive social machinery. It is that which cannot be contained in the striated, rigidly segmented social space; it consists of flows (speed), operates in a smooth space, and unties the social bond (codes) in multiplicity (mass-phenomena). In this respect “war”, or “fight”, is the surest mechanism against social organization: “just as Hobbes saw clearly that the State was against war, so war is against the State, and makes it impossible” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 357). It is crucial in this context that Deleuze and Guattari recognize a war machine as an assemblage that has as its object not war—war is only “the supplement” of the war machine—but the constitution of a creative line of flight, a smooth space. War is simply “a social state that wards off the State” (Ibid. 417). In this sense, violence is Fight Club’s supplement, not necessarily its object; Fight Club is above all a social state that wards off “society”. Fight Club proliferates in, or even better, constructs a nomadic social space without zones, centres, segments: a flattened space, in which one can “slide” through connections: “and” … “and” … “and”. Lines rather than points; connection rather than conjugation. Fight Club does not have a fixed spatiality, a permanent address; it grows like a rhizome, thorough discontinuous jumps. And temporally, it “exists only in the hours between when fight club starts and when fight club ends” (Palahniuk 1997: 48).

#### b) The impact to this arg is huge – the desire to achieve a plane of pure immanence cannot be brought into being without a massively violent clearing away of all remnants of transcendence.

William Rasch, Professor of Germanic Studies at the University of Indiana, 2004, Sovereignty and Its Discontents, p. 104-107

Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari offer a similar invitation. Our task— which is to say, philosophy’s task — is, finally, once and for all, to overcome the time honored but world-distorting distinction between transcendence and immanence. It is the philosopher, the true philosopher, and only the philosopher, who can institute the infinite plane of immanence we are to inhabit. That plane, which is, of course, not physical and not explicable according to ‘spatiotemporal coordinates’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p 37), can only be described by way of evocative similes and metaphors. If, for example, ‘concepts are like multiple waves, rising and falling’, then ‘the plane of immanence is the single wave that rolls them up and unrolls them’. Or, if ‘concepts are the archipelago or skeletal frame’, then ‘the plane is the breath that suffuses the separate parts’. And again: ‘Concepts are events, but the plane is the horizon of events, the reservoir or reserve of purely conceptual events: not the relative horizon that functions as a limit, which changes with an observer and encloses observable states of affairs, but the absolute horizon, independent of any observer, which makes the event as concept independent of a visible state of affairs in which it is brought about’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p 36). This last, of course, defines ontology as such. The world is, independent of its observers. Thus the world, or, in this case, the plane of immanence, ‘constitutes the absolute ground of philosophy, its earth or deterritorialization, the foundation on which it creates its concepts’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p 41). Nor is it unusual that the plane of immanence and what it grounds are described as absolute (‘Concepts are absolute surfaces or volumes, formless and fragmentary, whereas the plane is the formless, unlimited absolute, neither surface nor volume but always fractal’ [Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p 36]), unadulterated (‘the plane of immanence is always single, being itself pure variation’ IDeleuze and Guattari, 1994, p 39]), and infinite (‘That is why there are always many infinite movements caught within each other, each folded in the others, so that the return of one instantaneously relaunches another in such a way that the plane of immanence is ceaselessly being woven, like a gigantic shuttle. ... Diverse movements of the infinite are so mixed in with each other that, far from breaking up the One-All of the plane of immanence, they constitute its variable curvature, its concavities and convexities, its fractal nature as it were. ... The plane is, therefore, the object of an infinite specification so that it seems to be a One-All only in cases specified by the selection of movement’ [Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, pp 38,39]). All these images can be elucidated intelligently; or they can at least provoke further evocations that can make a powerful claim on our philosophical imagination. Yet, to repeat, none can demonstrate its own accuracy, and none can be demonstrated to be logically correct or empirically accurate. Nor should that be demanded of them. Of interest to us in the context of this study, however, is not the validity of these ontological claims, but the political world they imply or the political positions explicitly derived from them. The call for philosophy to constitute an infinite plane of immanence as a radically new ontology is made from within a particular narrative — in the case of Deleuze and Guattari, from within a rather Manichean philosophy of history. The characters in this world drama are Immanence, played by Philosophy (at its best), and Transcendence, portrayed, in all its evil disguises, by The Priestly Caste, which can include Philosophy (at its worst). ‘The Greeks’, Deleuze and Guattari write, ‘were the first to conceive of a strict immanence of Order to a cosmic milieu that sections chaos in the form of a plane. ... In short, the first philosophers are those who institute a plane of immanence like a sieve stretched over the chaos’. And it was Spinoza (with Nietzsche’s help) who showed us that the plane of immanence is ‘surrounded by illusions’, ‘thought’s mirages’, like the ‘illusion of transcendence’, the ‘illusion of universals’, the ‘illusion of the eternal’, and the ‘illusion of discursiveness’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, pp 49—50). But alas, such true philosophy has its enemies, and even within philosophy its false friends. From without, there is the priest, for instance, or the sociologist; there is the epistemologist, the linguist, the psychoanalyst, and the logician; and now, closest to home, there comes the ‘most shameful moment’, the moment of ‘computer science, marketing, design, and advertising, all the disciplines of communication’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p 10). And from within, there is the desire ‘to think transcendence within the immanent’, to think the functional equivalent of transcendence in the transcendental. This philosophic fall from grace (punctuated only by the above mentioned protests of a Spinoza or a Nietzsche) follows a fairly consistent trajectory marked by Plato, Christianity, and the modern invention and development of the transcendental subject by Descartes, Kant and Husserl (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, pp 44—48). Nevertheless, despite these philosophic Quislings, the world-historical battle is essentially conducted by Philosophy and Religion. The religious sage conceives of ‘the institution of an always transcendent order imposed from outside by a great despot or by one god higher than the others. ... Whenever there is transcendence, vertical Being, imperial State in the sky or on earth, there is religion; and there is Philosophy whenever there is immanence. ... Only friends can set out a plane of immanence as a ground from which idols have been cleared’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p 43). The irony — or is it tragedy? — of this radical immanence lies, of course, in the clearing away of these idols, for this ‘clearing’ is anything but friendly. If philosophy and only philosophy, if only true philosophy can institute immanence, then philosophy, perhaps in the personified guise of a Philosopher-King or, more romantically, a Philosopher-Revolutionary, must wage war against its enemies, those usurpers of its role coming from the realms of religion, the human sciences and social engineering. Radical immanence, it seems, can only be achieved by radically eliminating competing spheres of belief and knowledge, or, ironically, by instituting again a proper hierarchical relationship in which philosophy reigns supreme. Thus, the institution of a new, correct ontology and the new, infinite plane of immanence that that ontology allows cannot wait for the withering away of the state of transcendence, but must be put in place by revolutionary warfare, even if the revolution in question is ‘bloodless’. The post-revolutionary state is one in which the enemies of immanence have been defeated and in which all traces of the Gulag have been made to disappear. It is a state which friends and only friends can call home. That is, after all, what friends are for. If the enemy of pure immanence is transcendence, then within immanence the transcendental symbol of this impure, undesired and hierarchical political distinction is the feared and maligned notion of sovereignty. To maintain, as was done in the previous chapter, that sovereignty is the consequence of unavoidable logical paradox would seemingly confirm the putative poverty of Western metaphysics and thus the need for a radically new ontology (and ‘a completely new politics’) in which such paradox could never arise, or, at any rate, would be forever rendered invisible and ineffective. While the old metaphysics posits the primacy of violence (‘original sin’) and thus calls sovereignty into being as a kind of lightning rod, the new ontology would presuppose that sovereignty and the transcendental dominance it stands for causes the negative effects of social life. Thus the elimination of transcendental sovereignty will introduce a new social order that is precisely not an order, but a benevolent self-organization of all productive human endeavors. Though this attempt to delete sovereignty from political actuality has emerged with a vengeance in recent years, it is not new. Indeed, it was thought that the task had been successfully completed. Have not, after all, liberal individualism, pluralism, and most importantly the division of power supplanted the arbitrary willfulness of the absolute sovereign? Alas, we are told, though it now wears new clothes, the beast remains the same; only, the old dragon slayers have become the new dragons. Whereas the proto-liberal John Locke in the 17th century denounced monarchical absolutism in the name of parliamentary power, and whereas liberal theorists from the late 18th to the early 20th centuries, theorists like Wilhelm von Humboldt, John Stuart Mill and Harold Lash, denounced state supremacy in the name of the individual and the pluralism that would allow this individual to flourish, the new critics of sovereignty, which, in addition to Agamben, include Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, do not excoriate it in the name of liberalism, but rather condemn liberalism itself as the new form of sovereignty; for as it turns out, what liberalism replaced was not sovereignty as such, but particular modes of state sovereignty that characterized modern Europe up through the 19th century. Accordingly, the question Hardt and Negri ask is whether and how the modem, transcendental logic of sovereignty can now, finally, be supplanted by a universally benign immanence in which transcendently imposed order is replaced by egalitarian self-organization. Their book, Empire, assumes from the outset a positive answer to the question of whether such self-organization is possible, even if it leaves us little with which to answer the question of how such a transformation is to come about. To challenge their initial supposition —that pure immanence can exist without its constitutive other — may indeed indicate to the prophets of a new ontology that one is still mired in the nihilistic swamp of metaphysics. Nevertheless, the chiliastic spirit of the overly hopeful has its chilling moments as well. Thus, the question I propose to address here asks whether the logic of sovereignty can be expelled from the realm of the political, or whether its expulsion must ultimately also assume the expulsion of the political altogether. Can one desire, in other words, the overcoming of sovereignty from within the political, or must that desire always express itself as a quasi-theological longing for a post-political state, a New Jerusalem? My tentative answer to that question is: Though the ‘solution’ to the paradox of immanence that we call sovereignty — precisely because it is no solution — may take varied forms and can be re-fashioned in an incalculable number of ways, some more desirable than others, the paradox of sovereignty itself cannot be sublated; or rather, the logical paradox that sovereignty contingently and imperfectly solves is the logical paradox that radical immanence itself imposes on the modern structure of the political. The question that the concept of sovereignty answers and that therefore we must confront reads: In a world, in which order is not divinely ordained, how is order nevertheless possible?

### Off

#### 1. The idea that we can transcend capitalist production and get to a pure space of immanence away from capitalism IS the ideology of capitalism par excellance – their attempt to get outside merely replicates the structures they criticize

Diken and Laustsen 1 (Bülent Diken, lecturer in Sociology at Lancaster University, and Carsten Bagge Laustsen, Ph.D. student at the University of Copenhagen, Department of Political Sciences, September 2001, online: http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/papers/Diken-Laustsen-Enjoy-Your-Fight.pdf, accessed August 24, 2004)

The second strategy Fight Club adopts is, desperately searching for a non-consumerist domain outside capitalist exchange, heading toward a total anti-production, a potlach. The destruction of Jack’s perfectly appointed condo, his moving into Tyler’s dilapidated mansion on the edge of a toxic-waste dump, terrorizing the food industry, blowing up the financial buildings to sabotage the credit-card society, and so on. The ultimate aim of all this is the destruction of capitalism. Capitalism survives by sublimating commodities, transforming them into objects of desire, and Fight Club is obsessed by the desire to escape from the lure of the commodity form. Yet, is this desire for anti-production not the other side of the very capitalist fantasy? The reverse case of commodity fetishism is waste: the object devoid of its fetish-value; totally decommodified and de-sublimated object, which is indeed, according to Jacques-Alain Miller, the main production of contemporary capitalism. What makes Fight Club postmodern is precisely the realization that all consumption artefacts will become obsolete before being used and end as waste, transforming the earth into a gigantic waste land, which is a permanent feature of the capitalist drive (see Žižek 2000: 40-41). Waste is a sign of the growing significance of desublimation in contemporary capitalism. Herein lies also Fight Club’s mistake: the idea that use-value could be sustained without surplus-value production, that objects of desire would remain without their fetish value, that is, objet petit a (see Žižek 2000: 19, 21). Fight Club’s anti-consumerism is in this sense capitalism’s inherent fantasy, concealing the fact that capitalism without surplus-value production (and without surplus-enjoyment based on sublimation) is impossible. When the object is delivered from the sublime objet petit a, it becomes waste. Waste produced by Fight Club itself is thus the melancholy of capitalism in so far as melancholy defines the subject’s relation to objects that are deprived of their aura. Therefore Fight Club’s “sacrifice” is not subversive but supportive of capitalist desire. The paradox of Fight Club is that it makes an excess of sacrifice. It invests sacrifice itself with desire. “And it is only this desire, the very anti-desire, that is desire par excellence” (Žižek 2001: 41). Fight Club’s secret is then the culmination of the fetish character of the commodity. “The opaque character of the object a in the imaginary fantasy determines it in its most pronounced forms as the pole of perverse desire” (Lacan; quoted in Žižek 2001: 42). If avoidance of excess itself generates an excess, ”surplus enjoyment”, what Lacan calls the “temptation of sacrifice” is to ascertain that there is some symbolic authority, some Other, even if it does not grant what I want (see Žižek 2001: 64-5). Enter Fight Club: “getting God’s attention for being bad was better than getting no attention at all … God’s hate is better than His indifference” (Palahniuk 1997: 141). Again, Fight Club’s social critique is trapped in the framework of the symbolic order. Does the domain outside exchange, which Fight Club seeks to find, really exist in the network society? No. “There is no more outside” (Hardt & Negri 2000: 187). With the “real subsumption” of society under capital, “capital has become a world. Use value and all the other references to values and processes of valorization that were conceived to be outside the capitalist mode of production have progressively vanished” (Ibid. 386). The dialectic between “society” and “nature”, the “modern” and the “primitive”, the “mind” and the “drives”, the “public” and the “private”... has come to an end. What we have in the contemporary society is “a non-place of politics”, a spectacle, a virtual place, which is at once diffuse and unified (Ibid. 188-9). The smooth space, which is created by Fight Club, is in a sense also the space of the network society and its powers to be. Perhaps there is no topological contradiction between the ou-topia of the network society and the utopia of Fight Club. In this sense, Fight Club is the truth, or the symptom, of the reticular world. But Fight Club is in many respects typical of contemporary social movements. The masses in the contemporary society are driven by a desire for mobility: desertion, exodus and nomadism. Whereas resistance took the form of sabotage (direct/dialectical opposition) in the disciplinary era, in the contemporary era of control, resistance takes the form of desertion (flight, battles through subtraction, defection). Indeed, the mobility of the multitude, the migration of the masses, is the new “spectre” that haunts today’s reticular world (Ibid. 213-3). The new terrain of political struggle is mobility (Ibid. 214). Yet, as is the case with Fight Club, contemporary political struggles proliferate in an age of communication but they are “incommunicable”. But what they tend to loose regarding extension, duration and communicability, they gain regarding intensity. “They are forced to leap vertically and touch immediately on the global level” (Ibid. 54-55). In so far as capital extends its networks, singular points of revolt tend to become more powerful: “Empire presents a superficial world, the virtual center of which can be accessed immediately from any point across the surface”; in the depthless, spectacle-ised society every point is potentially a center (Ibid. 58). Which means that, for immanent struggles au milieu, the desire to be against, or disobedience to authorities, is no longer an obvious notion. Palahniuk argues that “Tyler plays the devil’s advocate against society…. Tyler’s motivation is perhaps to be against something, anything” (in CNN 1999). Yet, being against is not enough; as is the case with Fight Club, the problem of the network society is, rather, “how to determine the enemy against which to rebel” (Hardt & Negri 2000: 211).

#### 2. The logic of capitalism results in extinction through the creation of ecological catastrophe and violent imperialist wars that will turn nuclear

Foster 5 [John Bellamy, Monthly Review, September, Vol. 57, Issue 4, “Naked Imperialism”, <http://www.monthlyreview.org/0905jbf.htm>]

From the longer view offered by a historical-materialist critique of capitalism, the direction that would be taken by U.S. imperialism following the fall of the Soviet Union was never in doubt. Capitalism by its very logic is a globally expansive system. The contradiction between its transnational economic aspirations and the fact that politically it remains rooted in particular nation states is insurmountable for the system. Yet, ill-fated attempts by individual states to overcome this contradiction are just as much a part of its fundamental logic. In present world circumstances, when one capitalist state has a virtual monopoly of the means of destruction, the temptation for that state to attempt to seize full-spectrum dominance and to transform itself into the de facto global state governing the world economy is irresistible. As the noted Marxian philosopher István Mészáros observed in Socialism or Barbarism? (2001)—written, significantly, before George W. Bush became president: “[W]hat is at stake today is not the control of a particular part of the planet—no matter how large—putting at a disadvantage but still tolerating the independent actions of some rivals, but the control of its totality by one hegemonic economic and military superpower, with all means—even the most extreme authoritarian and, if needed, violent military ones—at its disposal.” The unprecedented dangers of this new global disorder are revealed in the twin cataclysms to which the world is heading at present: nuclear proliferation and hence increased chances of the outbreak of nuclear war, and planetary ecological destruction. These are symbolized by the Bush administration’s refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to limit nuclear weapons development and by its failure to sign the Kyoto Protocol as a first step in controlling global warming. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense (in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations) Robert McNamara stated in an article entitled “Apocalypse Soon” in the May–June 2005 issue of Foreign Policy: “The United States has never endorsed the policy of ‘no first use,’ not during my seven years as secretary or since. We have been and remain prepared to initiate the use of nuclear weapons—by the decision of one person, the president—against either a nuclear or nonnuclear enemy whenever we believe it is in our interest to do so.” The nation with the greatest conventional military force and the willingness to use it unilaterally to enlarge its global power is also the nation with the greatest nuclear force and the readiness to use it whenever it sees fit—setting the whole world on edge. The nation that contributes more to carbon dioxide emissions leading to global warming than any other (representing approximately a quarter of the world’s total) has become the greatest obstacle to addressing global warming and the world’s growing environmental problems—raising the possibility of the collapse of civilization itself if present trends continue. The United States is seeking to exercise sovereign authority over the planet during a time of widening global crisis: economic stagnation, increasing polarization between the global rich and the global poor, weakening U.S. economic hegemony, growing nuclear threats, and deepening ecological decline. The result is a heightening of international instability. Other potential forces are emerging in the world, such as the European Community and China,that could eventually challenge U.S. power, regionally and even globally. Third world revolutions, far from ceasing, are beginning to gain momentum again, symbolized by Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution under Hugo Chávez. U.S. attempts to tighten its imperial grip on the Middle East and its oil have had to cope with a fierce, seemingly unstoppable, Iraqi resistance, generating conditions of imperial overstretch. With the United States brandishing its nuclear arsenal and refusing to support international agreements on the control of such weapons, nuclear proliferation is continuing. New nations, such as North Korea, are entering or can be expected soon to enter the “nuclear club.” Terrorist blowback from imperialist wars in the third world is now a well-recognized reality, generating rising fear of further terrorist attacks in New York, London, and elsewhere. Such vast and overlapping historical contradictions, rooted in the combined and uneven development of the global capitalist economy along with the U.S. drive for planetary domination, foreshadow what is potentially the most dangerous period in the history of imperialism. The course on which U.S and world capitalism is now headed points to global barbarism—or worse. Yet it is important to remember that nothing in the development of human history is inevitable. There still remains an alternative path—the global struggle for a humane, egalitarian, democratic, and sustainable society. The classic name for such a society is “socialism.” Such a renewed struggle for a world of substantive human equality must begin by addressing the system’s weakest link and at the same time the world’s most pressing needs—by organizing a global resistance movement against the new naked imperialism.

#### 3. Vote negative to adopt the historical material criticism of the 1NC - historical analysis of the material conditions of capital is the only way to break free from is contradictions and social inequalities it causes

Tumino 1 (Steven, teaches at the City University of New York, Spring, What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More Than Ever Before)

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

#### 4. Class divisions are the root of all other oppressions

Kovel 2 (Alger Hiss Professor of Social Studies at Bard College, awarded Fellowship at the John Guggenheim Foundation, Joel, The Enemy of Nature, pages 123-124)

If, however, we ask the question of efficacy, that is, which split sets the others into motion, then priority would have to be given to class, for the plain reason that class relations entail the state as an instrument of enforce­ment and control, and it is the state that shapes and organizes the splits that appear in human ecosystems. Thus class is both logically and historically distinct from other forms of exclusion (hence we should not talk of 'classism' to go along with 'sexism' and 'racism,' and `species-ism'). This is, first of all, because class is an essentially man-made category, without root in even a mystified biology. We cannot imagine a human world without gender dis­tinctions – although we can imagine a world without domination by gender. But a world without class is eminently imaginable – indeed, such was the human world for the great majority of our species' time on earth, during all of which considerable fuss was made over gender. Historically, the difference arises because 'class' signifies one side of a larger figure that includes a state apparatus whose conquests and regulations create races and shape gender relations. Thus there will be no true resolution of racism so long as class society stands, inasmuch as a racially oppressed society implies the activities of a class-defending state.'° Nor can gender inequality be enacted away so long as class society, with its state, demands the super-exploitation of woman's labour. Class society continually generates gender, racial, ethnic oppressions and the like, which take on a life of their own, as well as profoundly affecting the concrete relations of class itself. It follows that class politics must be fought out in terms of all the active forms of social splitting. It is the management of these divisions that keeps state society functional. Thus though each person in a class society is reduced from what s/he can become, the varied reductions can be combined into the great stratified regimes of history — this one becoming a fierce warrior, that one a routine-loving clerk, another a submissive seamstress, and so on, until we reach today's personi­fications of capital and captains of industry. Yet no matter how functional a class society, the profundity of its ecological violence ensures a basic antagonism which drives history onward. History is the history of class society — because no matter how modified, so powerful a schism is bound to work itself through to the surface, provoke resistance (`class struggle'), and lead to the succession of powers. The relation of class can be mystified without end — only consider the extent to which religion exists for just this purpose, or watch a show glorifying the police on television — yet so long as we have any respect for human nature, we must recognize that so funda­mental an antagonism as would steal the vital force of one person for the enrichment of another cannot be conjured away.

#### 5. Historical materialism must come first - it predetermines consciousness and the very possibilities of reflective thinking

**Marx 1859** (Karl, a pretty important dude. “A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy: Preface” http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface.htm) JM

>edited for gendered language<

In the social production of their existence, [people] inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of [people] that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or – this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms – with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure. In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which [people] become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production. No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.

### Oil

#### New studies provide tested methods proving abiotic oil – we won’t run out.

Vey, 09 (Gary, editor for Viewzone, Quoting Vladimir Kutcherov, Adjunct professor, Department of Energy Technology – Royal Institute of Technology, September 12, 2009, “Fossils From Animals And Plants Are Not Necessary For Crude Oil And Natural Gas, Swedish Researchers Find” http://www.viewzone.com/abioticoilx.html, 8/1/12, atl)

What would happen if it were proven that "fossil fuels" weren't the result of decaying plant and animal matter, were actually created within the Earth due to simple chemistry and you could not be scared into believing that we were "running out" of oil and natural gas?¶ Estimates of how much crude oil we have extracted from the planet vary wildly. As late as May of 2009 a report published in the International Journal of Oil, Gas and Coal Technology suggested that we may have used more than we think.¶ The idea that we are running out of oil is not a new one. Scientists have told us that oil is a limited resource which was formed millions of years ago by the decaying vegetation and biomass of extinct species of plants and animals. With an estimated 1- trillion barrels of oil already extracted from deep wells since commercial drilling began around 1870, many predict that we are nearing the mid-point of remaining oil on the planet.¶ But there have always been those who claim that oil is a natural substance that forms automatically in the Earth's mantle. They say that it is virtually everywhere, if you can drill deep enough to tap it.¶ Proponents of so-called "abiotic oil" claim that the proof is found in the fact that many capped wells, which were formerly dry of oil, are found to be plentiful again after many years, They claim that the replenished oil is manufactured by natural forces in the Earth's mantle.¶ Critics of the abiotic theory disagree. They claim that capped wells may appear to refill after a few years, but they are not regenerating. It is simply an effect of oil slowly migrating through pore spaces from areas of high pressure to the low-pressure area of the drill hole. If this oil is drawn out, it will take even longer for the hole to refill again. They hold that oil is a non-renewable resource generated and deposited under special biological and geological conditions.¶ Until now these believers in "abiotic oil" have been dismissed as professing "bad science" but -- alas -- a new study has proven them correct!¶ Reported in ScienceDaily, researchers at the Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) in Stockholm have managed to prove that fossils from animals and plants are not necessary for crude oil and natural gas to be generated. The findings are revolutionary since this means, on the one hand, that it will be much easier to find these sources of energy and, on the other hand, that they can be found all over the globe.¶ "Using our research we can even say where oil could be found in Sweden," says Vladimir Kutcherov, a professor at the Division of Energy Technology at KTH.¶ Together with two research colleagues, Vladimir Kutcherov has simulated the process involving pressure and heat that occurs naturally in the inner layers of the earth, the process that generates hydrocarbon, the primary component in oil and natural gas.¶ According to Vladimir Kutcherov, the findings are a clear indication that the oil supply is not about to end, which researchers and experts in the field have long feared.¶ Abiotic Oil¶ The abiotic oil formation theory suggests that crude oil is the result of naturally occurring and possibly ongoing geological processes. This theory was developed in the Soviet Union during the Cold War, as the Union needed to be self sufficient in terms of producing its own energy. The science behind the theory is sound and is based on experimental evidence in both the laboratory and in the field. This theory has helped to identify and therefore develop large numbers of gas and [oil deposits](http://www.viewzone.com/abioticoilx.html). Examples of such fields are the South Khylchuyu field and the controversial Sakhalin II field.¶ In its simplest form, the theory is that carbon present in the magma beneath the crust reacts with hydrogen to form methane as well as a raft of other mainly alkane hydrocarbons. The reactions are more complicated than this, with several intermediate stages. Particular mineral rocks such as granite and other silicon based rocks act as catalysts, which speed up the reaction without actually becoming involved or consumed in the process.¶ Experiments have shown that under extreme conditions of heat and pressure it is possible to convert iron oxide, calcium carbonate and water into methane, with hydrocarbons containing up to 10 carbon atoms being produced by Russian scientists last century and confirmed in recent US experiments. The absence of large quantities of free gaseous oxygen in the magma prevents the hydrocarbons from burning and therefore forming the lower energy state molecule carbon dioxide. The conditions present in the Earth's mantle would easily be sufficient for these small hydrocarbon chains to polymerise into the longer chain molecules found in crude oil.¶ Vladimir Kutcherov adds that there is no way that fossil oil, with the help of gravity or other forces, could have seeped down to a depth of 10.5 kilometers in the state of Texas, for example, which is rich in oil deposits. As Vladimir Kutcherov sees it, this is further proof, alongside his own research findings, of the genesis of these energy sources -- that they can be created in other ways than via fossils. This has long been a matter of lively discussion among scientists.¶ "There is no doubt that our research proves that crude oil and natural gas are generated without the involvement of fossils. All types of bedrock can serve as reservoirs of oil," says Vladimir Kutcherov, who adds that this is true of land areas that have not yet been prospected for these energy sources.¶ But the discovery has more benefits. The degree of accuracy in finding oil is enhanced dramatically -- from 20 to 70 percent. Since drilling for oil and natural gas is a very expensive process, the cost picture will be radically altered for petroleum companies, and in the end probably for consumers as well.¶ "The savings will be in the many billions," says Vladimir Kutcherov.¶ To identify where it is worthwhile to drill for natural gas and oil, Vladimir Kutcherov has used his research to arrive at a new method. It involves dividing the globe into a finely meshed grid. The grid corresponds to fissures, so-called 'migration channels,' through underlying layers under the surface of the earth. Wherever these fissures meet, it is suitable to drill.¶ According to Vladimir Kutcherov, these research findings are extremely important, not least as 61 percent of the world's energy consumption derives from crude oil and natural gas.¶ The next step in this research work will involve more experiments, but above all refining the method will make it easier to find places where it is suitable to drill for oil and natural gas.¶ Vladimir Kutcherov, Anton Kolesnikov, and Alexander Goncharov's research work was recently published in the scientific journal Nature Geoscience.

#### Peak oil is not true. Increased drilling capacity, technology and new sources all mean that oil production is sustainable.

#### Removing restrictions allows ANWR to cause a sustainable shift to renewables

Buckner ’09 (Kathryn M, Carleton College, “Timing Development: A New Approach to ANWR,” 3/11, <http://www.carleton.edu/departments/geol/Resources/comps/CompsPDFfiles/2009/buckner2009.pdf>, TGA)

Since TAPS was completed in 1977, revenues from taxes associated with oil have

not only supported the state and also contributed $25 billion dollars to Alaska’s¶ Permanent Fund by the end of 1997. The Alaska Permanent Fund was created to support¶ the state of Alaska at such a time that the oil runs out (Thomas, 1999). What is most¶ interesting about the Permanent Fund is that it illustrates the potential size of revenues¶ from ANWR and how these revenues could be invested for future energy purposes. In¶ his 2008 study regarding the United States’ ability to wean itself off oil, Philip Fairey¶ found that “providing for the energy needs of our children and grand- children will¶ require substantial investments now—and dedication to multiple alternatives to buy time¶ for transition from oil to renewable fuels…time is important within this task; we must invest our energy in moving to more sustainable sources before our very financial¶ wherewithal to accomplish the task is exhausted [by expenditures on foreign oil]”(Fairey,¶ 2009). Additionally, the revenues from ANWR today would be much larger than the past¶ revenues contributed to the Alaska Permanent Fund. The Office of Management and¶ Budget and the Department of Interior have estimated that the federal government could¶ earn up to a total of $4.2 billion in bonus bids for ANWR in the first 5 years after¶ Congressional approval of development. They have further estimated that royalty and tax¶ estimates for the life of the 1002 area could range from $152-$237 billion (Arctic Power,¶ 2009). Another independent study found that revenues from these taxes are expected to¶ be on the order of $37 billion and $124 billion for the state of Alaska and the federal¶ government respectively (Kotchen, 2007). Either way, we are not talking pennies¶ anymore.¶

#### No reason why removing all restrictions would lead to a dramatic increase in production. Companies would work to avoid peak oil for long term profit.

### Deleuze

#### Deleuze himself wrote that the only relevant objection to a philosopher is that they do not pose the right questions – unfortunately for them, Deleuze’s questions are themselves not worth pursuing. Their affirmation of lines of flight and deterritorialization makes a communal ethic impossible. Their stark distinction between state and war machine replicates the dualisms they criticize and deters focus from the very real, material ways exploitation plays out across the world.

Peter Hallward, Professor in the Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy at Middlesex University, London, 2006, Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation, p. 161-162

Now Deleuze understands perfectly well why ‘most of the objections raised against the great philosophers are empty’. Indignant readers say to them: ‘things are not like that […]. But, in fact, it is not a matter of knowing whether things are like that or not; it is a matter of knowing whether the question which presents things in such a light is good or not, rigorous or not’ (ES, 106). Rather than test its accuracy according to the criteria of representation, ‘the genius of a philosophy must first be measured by the new distribution which it imposes on beings and concepts’ (LS, 6). In reality then, Deleuze concludes, ‘only one kind of objection is worthwhile: the objection which shows that the question raised by a philosopher is not a good question’, that it ‘does not force the nature of things enough’ (ES, 107; cC WP, 82). Deleuze certainly forces the nature of things into conformity with his own question. Just as certainly however, his question inhibits any consequential engagement with the constraints of our actual world. For readers who remain concerned with these con­straints and their consequences, Deleuze’s question is not the best available question. Rather than try to refute Deleuze, this book has tried to show how his system works and to draw attention to what should now he the obvious (and perfectly explicit) limita­tions of this philosophy of unlimited affirmation. First of all, since it acknowledges only a unilateral relation between virtual and actual, there is no place in Deleuze’s philosophy for any notion of change, time or history that is mediated by actuality In the end, Deleuze offers few resources for thinking the consequences of what happens within the actually existing world as such. Unlike Darwin or Marx, for instance, the adamantly virtual orientation of Deleuze’s ‘constructivism’ does not allow him to account for cumulative transformation or novelty in terms of actual materials and tendencies. No doubt few contemporary philosophers have had as an acute a sense of the internal dynamic of capitalism — but equally, few have proposed so elusive a response as the virtual ‘war machine’ that roams through the pages of Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Like the nomads who invented it, this abstract machine operates at an ‘absolute speed, by being “synonymous with speed”’, as the incarnation of ‘a pure and immeasurable multiplicity; an irruption of the ephemeral and of the power of metamorphosis’ (TP, 336, 352). Like any creating, a war machine consists and ‘exists only in its own metamorphoses’ (T~ 360). By posing the question of politics in the starkly dualistic terms of war machine or state — by posing it, in the end, in the apocalyptic terms of a new people and a new earth or else no people and no earth — the political aspect of Deleuze’s philosophy amounts to little more than utopian distraction. Although no small number of enthusiasts continue to devote much energy and inge­nuity to the task, the truth is that Deleuze’s work is essentially indifferent to the politics of this world. A philosophy based on deterritorialisation, dissipation and flight can offer only the most immaterial and evanescent grip on the mechanisms of exploitation and domination that continue to condition so much of what happens in our world. Deleuze’s philosophical war remains ‘absolute’ and ‘abstract’, precisely, rather than directed or ‘waged’ [menee]. Once ‘a social field is defined less by its conflicts and con­tradictions than by the lines of flight running through it’, any distinctive space for political action can only be subsumed within the more general dynamics of creation or life. And since these dynamics are themselves anti-dialectical if not anti-relational, there can be little room in Deleuze’s philosophy for relations of conflict or solidarity, i.e. relations that are genuinely between rather than external to individuals, classes, or principles.

#### They can’t simply say ‘that’s not our Deleuze’ to get out of our offense – Deleuze’s thought is fundamentally driven by an overarching concern with creativity and the abolition of constraints. This desire to become rhizomatic and break down constraints relinquishes the task of shaping society and history to those that currently occupy power. Deleuze’s alternative is literally a prescription to throw up our hands at the world and retreat into our own self-obsession.

Peter Hallward, Professor in the Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy at Middlesex University, London, 2006, Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation, p. 7

To insist in this way on the logic of creation as the primary if not exclusive focus of Deleuze’s work is undeniably to simplify aspects of his thought. My goal in this hook is not to engage in the detailed analysis of particular sequences or problems in Deleuze’s texts, but to characterise the dominant movement of his philosophy as a whole. For the sake of clarity and economy this characterization will pay little attention to the complex­ities of context or the occasional inconsistencies that must accompany the development of so large and wide-ranging a body of work. Despite these shortcomings, I think it’s fair to say that this approach remains broadly in line with Deleuze’s own way of reading other philosophers. Like Leibniz or Bergson, Deleuze assumes that every philosopher is animated by just one fundamental problem, and that to read a work of philosophy ‘does not consist in concluding from the idea of a preceding condition the idea of the follow­ing condition, but in grasping the effort or tendency by which the following condition itself ensues from the preceding “by means of a natural force”’)7 Every ‘philosophy’s power is measured by the concepts it creates’, ‘concepts that impose a new set of divi­sions on things and actions’. On the basis of the concepts they create, philosophers ‘subordinate and submit things to a question in such a way that, in this forced and con­strained submission, things reveal to us an essence, a nature. The main virtue of the question to which Deleuze’s project will itself be submitted in the following pages may be to reveal in a somewhat unexpected way the degree to which his work, far from engaging in a description or transformation of the world, instead seeks to escape it. The Deleuze that has long fascinated and troubled me is neither a worldly nor even a ‘relational’ thinker. If (after Marx and Darwin) materialism involves accept­ance of the fact that actual or worldly processes inflect the course of both natural and human history then Deleuze may not be a materialist thinker either. As Deleuze presents it, the destiny of thought will not be fundamentally affected by the mediation of society, history or the world; although Delenze equates being with the activity of creation, he orients this activity towards a contemplative and immaterial abstraction. More than a hundred and fifty years after Marx urged us to change rather than contemplate the world, Deleuze, like so many of his philosophical contemporaries, effectively recom­mends instead that we settle for the alternative choice. The real preoccupation of this book concerns the value of this advice.

#### **Deleuze conclusively believes death is bad. There is infinite potential to life and nothing more tragic than a life cut short. Value human existence above any other ontological paradigm.**

Deleuze and Partner, ‘98

[ABC Interview between Gillez Deleuze and Claire Parnet,

http://www.langlab.wayne.edu/cstivale/d-g/abc1.html, RSR]

Parnet wonders if Deleuze feels at all responsible for people who took drugs, who might have read Anti-Oedipus a bit too literally, as if he might have incited youths to commit stupid acts (conneries), and Deleuze's response is quite moving. He says that they always felt quite responsible for anyone for whom things went badly, and he personally always tried to do what he could for things to go well. He said he never played around with things like that; his only point of honor being never having told anyone to go on, it's ok, go get stoned, but always trying to help people make it through. He continues, saying that he is too sensitive to the smallest detail that might cause someone suddenly to slide over into complete blankness (état de blanc). He never cast blame on anyone, said anyone was doing anything wrong, but he felt the enormous weight of the directions some lives could take, people and especially young people who would take drugs to the point of collapse, or drinking to the point of falling into some "wild" state (état sauvage). He wasn't there to prevent anyone from doing anything, was not serving as a cop or a parent, but tried nonetheless to keep them from being reduced to pulp (état de loque). The moment there was a risk of someone cracking up, "je ne le supporte pas," I can't stand it. An old man who cracks up, Deleuze says, who commits suicide, he at least has already lived his life, but a young person who cracks up, Deleuze says it is insupportable. He was always divided, he concludes, between the impossibility of casting blame on anyone and the absolute refusal that anyone might be reduced to pulp. He admits that it is difficult to figure out what principles apply, one just deals with each case, and the least one can do is to prevent them from veering toward being reduced to pulp.

#### Caring about survival is inevitable and good.

Pyszcynski, Professor of Psychology at the University of Colorado, ‘4

[Tom, Social Research, “What are we so afraid of? A terror management theory perspective on the politics of fear”, Winter 2004,

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m2267/is\_4\_71/ai\_n13807478/]

TMT starts with a consideration of how human beings are both similar to, and different from, all other animals. We start with the assumption that, like all other animals, humans are born with a very basic evolved proclivity to stay alive and that fear, and all the biological structures of the brain that produce it, evolved, at least initially, to keep the animal alive. This, of course, is highly adaptive, in that it facilitates survival, and an animal that does not stay alive very long has little chances of reproducing and passing on its genes. But as our species evolved, it developed a wide range of other adaptations that helped us survive and reproduce, the most important being a set of highly sophisticated intellectual abilities that enable us to: a) think and communicate with symbols, which of course is the basis for language, b) project ourselves in time and imagine a future including events that have never happened before, and c) reflect back on ourselves, and take ourselves as an object of our own attention--self-awareness. These are all very adaptive abilities that play central roles in the system through which humans regulate their behavior--usually referred to as the self (cf. Carver and Scheier, 1998). These abilities made it possible for us to survive and prosper in a far wider range of environments than any other animal has ever done, and accomplish all that we humans have done that no other species ever has been capable of doing. However, these unique intellectual abilities also created a major problem: they made us aware that, although we are biologically programmed to stay alive and avoid things that would cut our life short, the one absolute certainty in life is that we must die. We are also forced to realize that death can come at any time for any number of reasons, none of which are particularly pleasant--a predator, natural disaster, another hostile human, and an incredible range of diseases and natural processes, ranging from heart attacks and cancer to AIDS. If we are "lucky" we realize that our bodies will just wear out and we will slowly fade away as we gradually lose our most basic functions. Not a very pretty picture. TMT posits that this clash of a core desire for life with awareness of the inevitability of death created the potential for paralyzing terror. Although all animals experience fear in the face of clear and present dangers to their survival, only humans know what it is that they are afraid of, and that ultimately there is no escape from this ghastly reality. We suspect that this potential for terror would have greatly interfered with ongoing goal-directed behavior, and life itself, if it were left unchecked. It may even have made the intellectual abilities that make our species special unviable in the long run as evolutionary adaptations--and there are those who think that the fear and anxiety that results from our sophisticated intelligence may still eventually lead to the extinction of our species. So humankind used their newly emerging intellectual abilities to manage the potential for terror that these abilities produced by calling the understandings of reality that were emerging as a result of these abilities into service as a way of controlling their anxieties. The potential for terror put a "press" on emerging explanations for reality, what we refer to as cultural worldviews, such that any belief system that was to survive and be accepted by the masses needed to manage this potential for anxiety that was inherent in the recently evolved human condition. Cultural worldviews manage existential terror by providing a meaningful, orderly, and comforting conception of the world that helps us come to grips with the problem of death. Cultural worldviews provide a meaningful explanation of life and our place in the cosmos; a set of standards for what is valuable behavior, good and evil, that give us the potential of acquiring self-esteem, the sense that we are valuable, important, and significant contributors to this meaningful reality; and the hope of transcending death and attaining immortality in either a literal or symbolic sense. Literal immortality refer to those aspects of the cultural worldview that promise that death is not the end of existence, that some part of us will live on, perhaps in an ethereal heaven, through reincarnation, a merger of our consciousness with God and all others, or the attainment of enlightenment--beliefs in literal immortality are nearly universal, with the specifics varying widely from culture to culture. Cultures also provide us with the hope of attaining symbolic immortality, by being part of something larger, more significant, and more enduring than ourselves, such as our families, nations, ethnic groups, professions, and the like. Because these entities will continue to exist long after our deaths, we attain symbolic immortality by being valued parts of them.

#### You should default to the middle ground – psychology is good FOR PEOPLE – but empirical studies prove you can’t scale it up to explain IR or revolutionary politics.

Epstein, senior lecturer in government and IR at the University of Sydney, ‘10

[Charlotte, “Who speaks? Discourse, the subject and the study of identity in international politics,” European Journal of International Relations XX(X) 1–24]

To be clear, this move is not intended to deny the intimate links between discourse and subjectivity. The earlier foray into Lacanian thought served precisely to underline the centrality of discourse to both the making and subsequent analysis of the subject. But by the same token it also drew out what is required to wield the discourse approach effec­tively in IR. Indeed Lacan’s analysis emphasizes the sheer complexity of the dynamics of a highly individual phenomenon (identity), and consequently the difficulties in taking this level as the starting point for analysing all other levels at which identity is politically at play.13 As the discipline that positions itself at the highest level of analysis (the supra­national), IR cannot maintain its focus at the level where some of the finer debates around subjectivity take place (see for example, Butler, 1997). The issue here is one of discipli­nary specificity, or, in other words, equipping IR for what it wants to do; and the solu­tion proposed is one of suspension or bracketing. To restate this important point differently, at the individual level, subjectivities and subject-positions remain coextensive. The distinction between subject-positions and subjectivities becomes operative once the analysis shifts beyond the individual level. This distinction thus offers a theoretically cogent way of studying identity while bracket­ing some of its more unwieldy dimensions that may, moreover, not be pertinent at the levels at which IR casts its focus. It renders the discourse approach operative for IR, because it makes it possible to study *state* identities, without having to presume that states have feelings, or indeed enter into questions of how much exactly are they like people, or what kind of selves do they possess. What the discourse approach analyses, then, is the ways in which actors — crucially, whether individuals or states — define themselves by stepping into a particular subject-position carved out by a discourse. In taking on the ‘I/we’ of that discourse, actors’ identities are produced in a very specific way. In doing so, they are establishing them­selves as the subjects of particular discourses, such as the anti-whaling discourse, and thereby marking themselves as ‘anti-whalers’. How, then, do discursive subject-positions differ from Wendt’s (1999: 227–229) role identities, where the actor is similarly seen as stepping into institutionalized roles (such as professor and student)? The crucial differ­ence is that the concept of subject-position does not harbour any assumption about any primordial self supporting these roles. Importantly, this is not to say that the self does not exist — that the professor or student have no selves — but simply that the concept is not relevant to the analysis of the discursive construction of identity, especially when taken to the interstate level.

#### Scaling up psychoanalysis fails for both SOLVENCY and DESCRIPTIVE POWER.

Sharpe and Goucher, ‘10

[Matthew (lecturer in philosophy and psychoanalytic studies at Deakin University) and Geoff (senior lecturer in literary and psychoanalytic studies at Deakin University), Žižek and Politics: An Introduction, p. 186]

• So here is the force of the second, methodological component to Žižek’s untenable erasure of the difference between politics and psychoanalysis. By looking at the contemporary world as a contemporary subject–object in need of the theorist’s liberating ‘psychoanalysis’, Žižek is unable to make a series of key sociotheoretical distinctions long recognised in political and socialtheoretical literature on complex societies. • The key one of these, as we saw in ‘Vanishing Mediations’, is the distinction between the lifeworld of subjects (their lived world of meanings wherein a psychoanalytic ideology critique can be highly informative) and the mediasteered subsystems – principally the economywhose workings demand an objectifying socialscientific analysis, not a psychoanalytic account. • The problem Žižek elides, in the words of his own teacher Althusser, is that modern posttraditional societies are a complex totality of ‘relatively autonomous’ instances – in Althusser’s thinking, the economy, the ideological and the political instances. • Then there is the question of which instance or level might be the predominant one in any particular historical regime. One practical consequence of this theoretical observation is that the peoples or potentials that might be either ‘symptomatic’ or particularly vital at one level (say, the ideological level) may be either well integrated or wholly disempowered at the other levels.

#### Psychoanalysis can’t explain complex sociopolitical events – there’s no methodology for applying it past the individual.

McDermott et al., ‘11

[Rose (Professor of Political Science at Brown University, “Applying Psychology to International Studies: Challenges and Opportunities in Examining Traumatic Stress,” International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 12 Iss. 2, May]

Concern about the external validity (that is, generalizability) of applying psychological constructs to real-world situations is a fundamental issue that has long been noted as problematic, as Irving L. Janis noted over 40 years ago (1958). The “gold standard” for research in psychology is the laboratory experiment. These setting are often dissimilar to real-world political situations in multiple ways, including the distilled nature of the hypothetical laboratory situation as well as the nature of the sample population, which is often comprised of college undergraduates. Also, psychological studies are dissimilar to real-world political situations in their operationalization of variables, which are often assessed by simple behaviors, such as choosing from an inventory of foreign policy choices in reaction to a news report in a study of fictional warring nations (Beer, Sinclair, Healy, and Bourne 1995). Such psychological research also tends to be dissimilar to real-world situations in its setting (often occurring within a laboratory in a psychology department of a university), timeframe (typically examining behavior occurring within a period of less than an hour), number of actors (often involving as few as two or three), and motivations of the participants (often for a modest payment or course credit). However, such laboratory studies also offer the benefit that they allow for control of the independent variables in ways that cannot be replicated in the analysis of complex real-world cases. Such control offers unrivalled possibilities for drawing accurate causal inferences. Political science often offers a way to test the external validity of ideas established in psychological laboratory experiments within real-world contexts. Increasingly, political scientists and psychologists have combined some of the strengths of rigorous experimental methods in the context of either embedded nationally representative surveys (Kuklinski, Sniderman, Knight, Piazza, Tetlock, Lawrence, and Mellers 1997) or in field experiments both within the United States (Gerber and Green 2000) as well as abroad (Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, and Weinstein 2007). However, the question of the value of laboratory vs field experimentation, like the larger issue of internal as opposed to external validity which it reflects, extends beyond questions of generalizability to incorporate ethical concerns as well. Even the most sophisticated experimental designs in a laboratory cannot come even close to generating the kind of traumatic experience that a person would endure if they were to lose a loved one in a war, nor should such a replication ever be sought. However, as a result, scientists’ ability to approximate the real-world experiences of something like, say, traumatic stress will be necessarily limited to either lesser forms of induced stress, or the study of those who have endured such events in their real lives. In the latter case, questions of self-selection and unknown pre-morbid experiences and vulnerabilities will always complicate the analysis and limit the degree of generalizability to the larger population we seek to characterize. Methods outside of the laboratory—such as surveys—are frequently used in applying psychological and political constructs to international issues and can also incorporate experimental manipulations that allow for control of the independent variables (for example, Koopman, Snyder, and Jervis 1990; Kuklinski et al. 1997). However, every methodological approach has its limitations, with the findings yielded by surveys also brought into question because of possible biases in sampling due to large numbers of potential respondents who refuse to participate and possible biases in the responses (for example, social desirability) that can affect the internal validity of the results. The application of psychological interpretations to analyzing actual political cases is not without limitations. Inevitably, methodological limitations raise concerns in using any available methodology to apply psychological perspectives to real-world situations in the international context.

#### This is overwhelmingly, empirically true.

Boettcher, Professor of Political Science and Public Administration at North Carolina State University, ‘4

[William, “The Prospects for Prospect Theory: An Empirical Evaluation of International Relations Applications of Framing and Loss Aversion,” Political Psychology, Vol. 25, No. 3]

Unfortunately, the process through which decisions are “framed” remains poorly understood. We lack a theory of framing because the psychologists have yet to give us one and we have failed to develop one on our own (rare attempts are discussed below). Despite a decade of work exploring prospect theory empirically, there has been little progress in developing clear and consistent criteria for simply identifying the frame used by a particular decision-maker (or group of decisionmakers). Although we have happily borrowed intuitively compelling notions such as reference points, gain/loss coding, preference reversals, and loss aversion, we have failed to specify the scope conditions that may limit the applicability of prospect theory within our field of study. In part, this may be due to a lack of familiarity with (or understanding of) recent research on prospect theory in other fields; but it also stems from a reluctance to test prospect theory using experiments that mimic “real world” decisions. These experiments are difficult to construct and costly to execute, and they sometimes produce inconclusive (or even worse, incoherent) results. Nonetheless they are absolutely necessary, because they provide an empirical foundation and practical “road map” for more ambitious adventures.